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| "YES - NO" |
today found in Turkey, the lengthy discussion referendum on constitutional amendments first semi-official reports indicate that about 58% voted for and 42% against a constitutional amendment.. The turnout was about 77%. The vote Output is regarded as a success of the Erdoğan government. The government now has the possibility to modify the military junta (after the coup of 12 September 1980) Constitution of 1982 introduced important changes.
be sure, had heated the democratic minds in the months before significant. The nay-sayers were recruited from concrete Ataturkisten (represented in parliament by the CHP / Republican People's Party) and ethnic nationalists (represented in parliament by the MHP / Nationalist Movement Party). While some undermining secularist "achievements" fear, lashing out against the others, especially eine angebliche Auflösung des (National-)Staats. Die Ja-Sager sind vor allem Anhänger der liberal-religiösen Regierungspartei (AKP) sowie vorwiegend säkularisierte aber auf individuelle Freiheiten pochende Postmodernisten.
Wichtiger als die anstehenden formalen Änderungen der Verfassung könnte der psychologische Effekt dieses Volksbegehrens sein. Zum erstenmal in der Geschichte der modernen Türkei hat sich eine relative Mehrheit offiziell gegen die Machtstrukturen der ataturkistischen Oligarchen aus Militär, Justiz und Politik ausgesprochen.
Der Nimbus der Allmächtigkeit und Unantastbarkeit This oligarchy has received a significant scratches. This can be seen as a first step towards a fundamental revision of the republican era. This, however, are far from all the psychological, political and legal obstacles on the path towards a (re-) reflection on one's own cultural values \u200b\u200bresolved. That of the "bloodless civil war" to stop short and medium term, is shown. The referendum result should not hide the fact. The problem of Turkey is a psychosis of historic proportions, which imposes due to internal and external dynamisms only recently the public consciousness more and more.
The Wall Street Journal published in early May 2010, an article about this "bloodless civil war." For the product led to the Wall Street Journal correspondent Marc Champion and an interview with the editor of the journal Islamic Yeni Furkan , Sadeddin Ustaosmanoğlu. not published by the Wall Street Journal, the interview with Yeni Furkan was published online.
Here is the complete German translation:
be sure, had heated the democratic minds in the months before significant. The nay-sayers were recruited from concrete Ataturkisten (represented in parliament by the CHP / Republican People's Party) and ethnic nationalists (represented in parliament by the MHP / Nationalist Movement Party). While some undermining secularist "achievements" fear, lashing out against the others, especially eine angebliche Auflösung des (National-)Staats. Die Ja-Sager sind vor allem Anhänger der liberal-religiösen Regierungspartei (AKP) sowie vorwiegend säkularisierte aber auf individuelle Freiheiten pochende Postmodernisten.
Wichtiger als die anstehenden formalen Änderungen der Verfassung könnte der psychologische Effekt dieses Volksbegehrens sein. Zum erstenmal in der Geschichte der modernen Türkei hat sich eine relative Mehrheit offiziell gegen die Machtstrukturen der ataturkistischen Oligarchen aus Militär, Justiz und Politik ausgesprochen.
Der Nimbus der Allmächtigkeit und Unantastbarkeit This oligarchy has received a significant scratches. This can be seen as a first step towards a fundamental revision of the republican era. This, however, are far from all the psychological, political and legal obstacles on the path towards a (re-) reflection on one's own cultural values \u200b\u200bresolved. That of the "bloodless civil war" to stop short and medium term, is shown. The referendum result should not hide the fact. The problem of Turkey is a psychosis of historic proportions, which imposes due to internal and external dynamisms only recently the public consciousness more and more.
The Wall Street Journal published in early May 2010, an article about this "bloodless civil war." For the product led to the Wall Street Journal correspondent Marc Champion and an interview with the editor of the journal Islamic Yeni Furkan , Sadeddin Ustaosmanoğlu. not published by the Wall Street Journal, the interview with Yeni Furkan was published online.
Here is the complete German translation:
Wall Street Journal: It is said İsmailağa the community would be separated because of their clothing, the rejection of Fernsehn and the Internet and its conservative beliefs of the other groups in society. Is it correct to say that attempts to İsmailağa community is abzusondert of the elements of modern secular Turkey? S. Ustaosmanoğlu: order here again the phrase "from other groups in society separates" to take as a starting point. If we just past hundred years of Turkish Gesellschaft betrachten, werden wir im Grunde nicht eine Trennung der İsmailağa-Gemeinde von den anderen Gesellschaftsgruppen sondern eher eine Trennung der anderen Gesellschaftsgruppen von dem Bedeutungsgehalt sehen den die Gemeinde repräsentiert... D.h. unsere Gemeinde legt ein Verhalten an den Tag der den Widerstand einer tausendjährigen traditionalen Struktur repräsentiert. Was das Thema Fernsehn und Internet betrifft; da es nicht möglich ist sich solchen aus dem Westen kommenden Stürmen zu widersetzen, kann nur von einem Widerstand gegen die Inhalte dieser Mittel die Rede sein; ein opponieren im technologischen Sinne wäre ohnehin Dummheit. Dann muß man aber auch im Blick behalten dass unsere Gemeinde eine Tasawwuf-Gemeinschaft ist. Denn der Lebensstandart solcher Gemeinden formiert sich nicht nach hedonistischen Weltanschauungen. D. h. es wird versucht die Dinge von ihren Beziehungen zum seelischen her zu kontrollieren. Das ist ein Thema, dass von säkularen Gesellschaften nicht gerade leicht verstanden werden kann. Worum es hier geht, ist nicht die Absonderung von säkularen Elementen, es geht darum aufzuzeigen dass die säkularen Grundsätze der menschlichen Natur entgegengesetz sind. Das ist es, was mit all seinen psychologischen und soziologischen Bedeutungsebenen erörtert werden muss .
WSJ: Wieviele Followers, the İsmailağa community in Turkey is estimated? This number has increased in the last ten years in basic dimensions or decreased? Was it hard from the state interference with the İsmailağa community?
S. Ustaosmanoğlu : It is not possible to give exact figures. However, approximate calculations are based on about ten million. From a basic increase in I do not want to talk, in accordance with the fundamental structure of society is a stable growth evident. To date, there was part of the state not seriously hard intervention. There was only a scornful attitude, because the structure of the community was considered by the state as unadäquat with the official after-republican politics. From time to time there are areas out of public attitudes toward and utilization. Such can be felt in the form of populist political maneuvers.
WSJ: If the supporters of İsmailağa community for a government of Turkey by the Sharia?
S. Ustaosmanoğlu: Yes ... But, here it is important to clarify one thing. This thing is somewhat concerned that the whole of Turkish society ... First must be understood that prevails within the Turkish society is enormous confusion. The reason for the mental trauma that was caused by the reforms. Especially after the writing reform is like a fish on land, the company experienced the trauma continues, exactly what she wants or does not want it can not truly estimate. Taking account also of the people not belonging to the community, I would say, as long as the people in this country say "I'm Muslim," they are not empowered to say "I want the Sharia is not", but that this in fact is so advised by the trauma into oblivion. Kurds, Turks and all the other ethnic groups, these are people in favor of the Ottoman past, remember not even think that the laws applied by the Ottomans was based on the Schariagesetzgebung. Legislation the IDPs even from Jews all over the world, said with satisfaction. Well, despite all the negative effects of the trauma, the Turkish society is reminiscent of its past, will also remember more. Short, not only the İsmailağa community, society as a whole and beyond even the Islamic World turns to their natural disposition. This course of action can not be prevented .
WSJ: İlhan Cihan had in 2007 in Erzincan against unauthorized Koran schools, the pre-school children taught enforcement. But, as I hear are those schools in Turkey have long been widespread and tolerated [unofficially]. If there are such schools, it is true that were brought from the surrounding villages Erzincan children in these schools and recent years have been three and a half?
S. Ustaosmanoğlu: You see, without knowing is the sociological structure of Turkey is very difficult to analyze of such matters. Such courses are an undeniable reality Koran Turkey. And, it is not possible to eliminate this reality. Especially since the founding of the Republic, also the state is in a terrible trauma, and the state with the people just do not come to peace. Therefore, the state adopts amateurish in the implementation of these fundamental requirements. The government attempts to stifle such desires, and to impose its own requirements makes it clear that the state has no idea of going deep into the nature of these requests. But we see right now how even the main pillar of the state takes Namely, the Republican People's Party (the party founded by Ataturk) distance from the serious objections to Koran courses, the wearing of the veil for women, or the turban of the men. The desire of the people turn back to his nature, is not met with more resistance earlier times ... The claim that three and a half year old children were enrolled in these courses Koran is pure comedy ... How can a child just because the breast is even weaned satisfy the conditions of such a body? Since the Lord has exaggerated prosecutor!
WSJ: İlhan Cihan accused the İsmailağa community also to train their own imams, and thus the authority competent state institutions undermined. Is this true? If so, how long will this state to know?
S. Ustaosmanoğlu: what the prosecutor would have to ask on here first thing is, but the question why a secular state exerts over all priests form. First, it is wrong that a secular state behaves Sun Secondly, the reason for such an effort it is society to maneuver in a non-natural with its matching of life ... The trauma makes itself felt here. Furthermore, we encounter the resistance of the society, the desire to turn to a faith with its matching lifestyle. And finally, a municipality can not make priests in a state-controlled mosque must convey. Since the early years of the Republic are seen between society and state such and similar situations. But like I said, now is an enormous flexibility observed.
WSJ: If the facts in Erzincan only been taken by many in recent years or is it the only? If the allegations concerning the opening of independent schools and training its own priest is true, they can explain the reasons why the İsmailağa community has such a need? Or put another way, why do children need preschool a Koranic education? Why government ministers are not considered adequate?
S. Ustaosmanoğlu: I think this was in their previous question already answered in part ... What I can add is this, this determination is in their dimensions, the first determination. The underlying intention is not directly to do with our community ... About the Ergenekon case it bears more the intention of a [political] attraction to the government. When we tried with one of the nine arrested people from our community to lead an interview, we have seen how strong he was intimidated. He told us: "The people who arrested us, told us" This is revenge for Ergenekon. With you we have started, as the next-Fethullah people turn. "I think the thing is you can!
WSJ: Why did they think İlhan Cihan year investigation began in 2007 against the İsmailağa community?
S. Ustaosmanoğlu: For reasons I mentioned. Turkey is experiencing a very special process. Because these forces have realized that their authority has come to waver, they resort to various attractions .
WSJ: İlhan Cihan mentioned in his investigation report he sent to Erzurum, that he faced a number of facilities, including the Furkan Association, could not finish his investigation. This document also pointed out that neither against unauthorized institutions or against their families, the daughters are not in the [state] school send steps have been taken. Moreover, could the investigation into aspects of financial transactions to Chechnya and Palestine, inconsistencies in various tenders and the "propaganda" activities of İsmailağa community can not be completed. The same document also expressly noted that there is no evidence as is a violent and armed organization. What they believe tried İlhan Cihan with all this?
S. Ustaosmanoğlu: First I must explain to the following: the Furkan Club of the discussion here, has nothing to do with the magazine Yeni Furkan, the main editor, I am . With respect to his scolding, the institutions of the prosecutor, of course, wrong, especially under present legislation he would have to wear a hat but does not do this! So in this country are so few things left in the past that no one cares about it. These are all signs of the trauma of which I spoke. For this trubulenten process shows that the State has become the plaything of gangs. The associated negative symptoms partially go further still. order to Chechnya, Palestine, etc come to question. How now? While the Russians in Chechnya, Israel in Palestine to kill Muslims do not stir the local Muslims? This is a matter of conscience, which has laws and the like to control. Moreover, one can also argue about whether the evidence of Mr. Prosecutor real evidence are. On the subject of the tender manipulation is common offenses. If someone has made a misdemeanor guilty he will vouch for that. The reason I call this vile crime is as follows, and such financial matters are appropriate for the public to arouse suspicion and are therefore always used as a garnish. Cihan explicit indication that the community is not prone to violence has probably the following reason: if the town falls within the range of the armed organization, the special prosecutor would take the case of Erzurum. Probably this will be stressed only reason to avoid the case be dropped off. But with the ad was the case by Cihan the special prosecutor revoked. As I have already pointed out previously, it goes into the matter, of course not the İsmailağa community. The real thing is based on the events surrounding Ergenekon. The community was classified here as easy to use Pawn. But looks, as far as we can see how this is like as if the other side [the AKP] of this game has spoiled.
(translation: Algabal)
